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Abstract. In this paper, we model - quantitatively – a possible realistic interaction between a tax-payer and his 
Government. We formalize, in a general setting, this strategic interaction. Moreover, we analyze completely a particular 
realistic sample of the general model. We determine the entire payoff space of the sample game; we find the unique Nash 
equilibrium of the interaction; we determine the payoff Pareto maximal boundary, conservative payoff zone and the conservative 
core of the game (part of Pareto boundary greater than the conservative payoff vector). Finally, we suggest possible compromise 
solutions between the two players. From an economic point of view, the sample chosen gives an example of normative 
settings, for which there is no reason (convenience), for the tax-payer, to evade the taxes or to declare less than his 
real income. Moreover, the two proposed compromise solutions (which realize the maximum collective gain) could be 
significantly applied to distinguished tax-payer (big companies and so on). 
 
1. The model 
We shall consider a two-player normal form gain game, G = (f, >), representing the rational interaction between the 
Government (first player 1) and a Taxpayer (second player 2), in a country. The payoff function f : E × F → IR2 of our 
game shall be defined upon the bi-strategy space of the game, Cartesian product of the respective strategy spaces of the two 
players, and with values into the payoff universe IR2. The two components f1 and f2 of the function f are the respective 
payoff function of the two players. 
 
1.1 Strategy spaces 
1.1.1 Government. The unit interval U = [0,1] is the strategy set of the Government, a probabilistic interval: each element x 
of the unit interval U is the probability that the Government checks the real (true) income of the Taxpayer. 
1.1.2 Tax-payer. The compact interval F = [0,V] is the range of possible income declarations of the Taxpayer, each element 
y in F is a possible income that the Taxpayer may decide to declare to the Government, V is the true income of the 
taxpayer. 
 
1.2 Payoff function of the Government. 
We consider, firstly, the payoff function of the Government, in his interaction with the Taxpayer 2; it is, as usual, a real 
function f1: [0,1] × [0,V] → R. To construct the payoff function f1 (that is, to define its “correspondence law”) we shall 
proceed step by step. 
1.2.1 First step. Firstly, we consider the case in which the Government checks the Taxpayer declaration, that is, the strategy 
1 of the Government. In this case, we have  
f1(1, y) =  tV+ g(t)(V - y) - C, 
for every strategy y in F, where: 
a) the fixed real number t, belonging to IU, is the percentage (the unit interval U is now interpreted in a different 
way), due by the Taxpayer to the Government, upon his real income V. Hence, a first income of the Government, 
in this case, is the discounted cash flow tV; 
b) the real number g(t) > t is the fixed percentage due, by the taxpayer, to the Government upon his own non-
declared income (V – y); so that, the Government receives also the discounted cash flow g(t)(V - y); 
c)  at last, the real number C is the cost afforded by the Government to check the tax evasion. 
1.2.2 Second step. Secondly, we consider the case in which the Government does not check (at all) the taxpayer declaration 
and accept the strategy y of the Tax-payer as his true income, so that, we have: 
f1 (0,y) = ty, 
for every strategy y of the second player. 
1.2.3 Third step. To obtain the values of the function f1, on the remaining part of the bi-strategy space, we shall use the 
von Neumann mixed-extension method, but only with respect to the first finite strategy space {0,1} of the Government. In 
other terms, we shall consider – for every strategy y of the Taxpayer - the mixed extension of the finite stochastic variable 
L(y) : {0,1} → R, defined by 
L(y)(0) = f1 (0,y) = ty   and   L(y)(1) = f1 (1, y) =  tV+ g(t)(V - y) - C ,  
by using the probabilistic scenarios only for the actions of the Government (see later for a robust justification of this 
probabilistic choice and its applicability). We so have: 
f1 (x, y)  =  E(1-x, x) (L(y)) = 
 = E(1-x, x) (ty , tV + g(t)(V - y) - C) = 
   =  (1- x) ty + x [tV+ g(t) (V- y) - xC] = 
   =  x [tV + g(t)(V- y) - C - ty ]+ ty . 
 
1.3 Payoff function of the second player, the Taxpayer. 
In general, for the payoff function of the second player, we have: 
 f2(0,y) = (V- y) + (1 - t)y, 
for every y in F; indeed, when the government does not check the possible evasion, the Taxpayer net income is: 
1) the non-declared income (V- y) (considered as it is, since there are no taxes on it) 
2) plus the declared income y minus the tax ty , which player 2 has to pay because of the declaration y. 
When the Government decides to check the declaration of the Taxpayer, we obtain: 
 f2(1, y) =(1-t)V - g(t)(V- y), 
for every y in F, indeed, when the Government checks the possible evasion, the Taxpayer net income is: 
1) the non-declared income (V- y) minus a higher tax g(t)(V- y) - with respect to the usual taxation t(V- y) - because 
of the evasion; 
2) plus the real income V minus the tax tV on the real income V, which player 2 has to pay because the Government, 
after the check, knows the real income V of the Taxpayer. 
1.3.1 Mixed extension. By adopting the von Neumann mixed extension method, as before only on the Government 
strategies, we obtain:  
 f2 (x,y) = E(1-x, x) ((V - y)+(1 - t)y, (1- t)V - g(t)(V- y)) =  
             = (1- x) ((V - y)+ (1 - t)y)+ x((1- t)V - g(t)(V- y)), 
for every pair (x,y) in the bi-stategy space. 
 
1.3 Payoff function of Government-Taxpayer Game. 
Resuming the above results, we can finally give the definition of the payoff vector  function of our entire game G; it is 
defined by 
   f(x,y) = (x [tV + g(t)(V- y) - C - ty ] + ty ,  (1- x) [(V - y)+ (1 - t)y] + x[(1- t)V - g(t)(V- y)]), 
for every (x,y) in the strategic square S. 
 
2. Numerical example 
To build up a computable and realistic example, we shall put: t = 25% = ¼ , g(t) = ½  = 50% , C = ¼ and V = 1. 
Remark (on the strategy sets). (1) In the above example, we are normalizing the real income V; so that, also the 
declaration strategy y belongs to the compact unit interval U = [0,1], 0 means total Tax Evasion (declaration 0), 1 means No 
Tax Evasion (the declaration y equals the real income V). (2) Any strategy x of the first player belongs to [0,1], but the 
meaning is completely different, as it is emphasized in the following remark. 
Remark (interpretation of strategy spaces). The interpretations of our strategy spaces are obvious and recalled below: 
a) the strategy space E is a probabilistic strategy space; 
b) the strategy space F (of the second player) is a “money” strategy space; 
c) any strategy x of E has a probabilistic meaning: probability 0 means “No check the possible tax evasion of the 
Taxpayer”; probability 1 means “to check the possible tax evasion of the player 2”; 
d) from a frequency point of view, the probabilistic strategy x is realizable by checking n = x m taxpayer declarations, 
where m is the total number of taxpayers. 
2.1 Payoff functions 
Let us see the form of our particular payoff functions. 
2.1.1 Payoff function of the Government. In our numerical example, we have: 
 f1 (x, y) = x((1/4) V + (1/2) (V- y) - (1/4) - (1/4)y)+ (1/4)y =  
  = x ((3/4) – (1/2) y – (1/4) – (1/4) y)) + (1/4)y = 
  = x ((1/2) – (3/4) y))+ (1/4) y =  
  = x/2 - (3/4)xy + y/4, 
for every pair (x,y) in the square U2 . 
2.1.2 Payoff function of the taxpayer. In our numerical example, we have: 
f2(x, y)    = (1- x) (1- y +(3/4)y + x((3/4) –(1/2)(1- y))=  
= (1- x) (1- (1/4)y) + x(1/4)+(y/2)) =  
= (1- (y/4))- x + (x/4) y + (x/4) + (x/2) y =  
= 1- (3/4) x + (3/4) xy - y/4, 
for every pair (x,y) in U2. 
2.1.3 Payoff function of the sample game. Concluding, in our numerical example, the payoff function of the entire game 
is defined by 
f (x, y) = (x/2 + y/4 – (3/4) xy ,  1 - (3/4) x + (3/4) xy – y/4) =  
           = (1/4) (2x + y - 3xy, -3x – y + 3xy) + (0,1), 
for every strategy profile (x,y) of the game G. 
2.1 Tridimensional representation of the game (f,>) 
In this subsection, we present a 3D representation of the sample game (f,>). This representation simply consists of the 
union of the graphs of the two payoff functions. The mostly higher surface is the graph of the Government payoff function, 
the mostly lower surface is he graph of the Tax-payer payoff function. 
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Note that, there is a connected part of the bi-strategy square on which the Tax-payer function is greater than the 
Government function. We represent it in the following figure. 
 Figure 05. 
 
3. Digression: Why the tax payer should pay the taxes? 
Note that our game is a non-zero and non-constant sum game: the aggregate payoff function s of our game G is the real 
function defined on the bi-strategy space by s(x, y) = - ¼ x + 1, for every probability strategy x of the Government. The 
interpretation is quite clear: 
a) 1 is the total income of the tax payer, which is in this context the only effective income of the game  
b) and ¼ x is the expense of the Government for checking the evasion, when it decides to employ the strategy x. 
Observe, moreover, that the maximum, on the strategy space U, of this social sum s is attained at any bi-strategy point (0,y), 
with y in U, and this maximum is 1 (the Taxpayer real income). So that, the maximum collective gain 1 = maxU (s), 
corresponds to the situation in which the Government does not check the declaration of the Taxpayer (0 expenses for 
checking it). Of course, in this case, the Taxpayer (if he is aware of the Government strategy) will choose to declare nothing 
(his strategy 0) and the total collective payoff remains only in the Taxpayer’s hands. obviously this last situation is a selfish bad 
scenario for the human society: but this is also the reason at the root of the tax evasion. The key-solution for the 
collectivity is that the tax tV (or ty or g(t)(V-y), and so on…) should be used by the Government “much better” than how 
much the taxpayer itself can do! In other terms, to convince the Taxpayer to pay the taxes, the Government should employ the 
capitals deriving from taxes at an income rate iG such that, for any reasonable tax payer individual income rate iT, one has 
(for instance in the case of truthful declaration) 
(1+ iG) tV + (1+ iT)(1- t)V > (1+ iT)V, 
i.e., a rate of income that makes the social sum (1+ iG) tV + (1+ iT)(1- t)V greater than the potential future income (1+ iT)V, 
of the Taxpayer. 
 
4. The Complete Analysis of our sample game 
In this section we conduct the complete analysis of the game (f, >). At this aim, we observe that the payoff function f, of 
our numerical example, is viewable as 0.25 g + (0,1), where we have considered the “payoff kernel” g, defined by 
g(x,y)= (2x + y - 3xy, -3x – y + 3xy), 
for every bi-strategy (x,y). We shall study only this kernel g, since any information on the game (f, >) is deductible from the 
game (g, >), by a 0.25 rigid contraction and then by a (0,1) translation. 
 
4.1 The bi-strategy space 
As we already saw, the bi-strategy space of our game is the square U2, it is represented in the following figure. 
 
 Figure 1. The bi-strategy space (square) S. 
 
4.2 The Payoff space 
Our first significant aim is to find the payoff space of the game (g, >), that is the image g(S) of the vector payoff function g 
(the image of the bi-strategy square S under g). At this aim, we transform the topological boundary fr(S) of the square S, that 
is the union of the 4 edges of the square; and moreover, we have also to transform the critical zone cr(g) of g (set of bi-
strategies at which the Jacobian matrix is not-invertible): the boundary of the image of g, is contained into the union of 
g(fr(S)) and g(cr(g)): 
 fr(g(S)) ⊆ g(fr(S)) ∪ g(cr(g)). 
So let’s go to study the Critical zone of g. 
4.2.1 Critical zone. The critical zone of the function g is the set of all bi-strategies (x,y) at wich the Jacobian matrix (family) 
is not invertible. The Jacobian family of the function g  - defined by  
g(x,y)= (2x + y - 3xy, -3x – y + 3xy), 
for every bi-strategy (x,y) -  is the pair of gradients  
 J(g)(x,y) = (grad(g1), grad(g2)) = 
= ((2 - 3y , 1 - 3x) , (3y - 3 , 3x - 1)). 
The Jacobian determinant of the function g at the point (x,y) is the determinant of the vector family J(g)(x,y), that is the real 
number: 
 det J(g)(x,y) = (2 - 3y)(3x - 1) + (3y - 3)(3x - 1) = 
      = 6x - 2 - 9xy + 3y + 9xy - 3y - 9x + 3 = 
      = -3x + 1. 
So the Jacobian family is not invertible at the point (x,y) if and only the abscissa x is equal to 1/3. Concluding the critical 
zone of the function g is the segment 
cr(g) = U(0,1) + (1/3,0), 
or, if you prefer, the segment 
cr(g) = [(1/3,0), (1/3,1)]. 
The critical zone is the subset of points (x,y) of the plane with x = 1/3 and y in U, it is the segment [P, Q] represented in the 
following figure 2. 
 
 Figure 2. The Critical zone [P,Q] in bi-strategy space. 
 
4.2.2 Payoff space. Since the boundary of the payoff space is contained into the union of the transformation of the 
boundary of the square S and since the critical zone in the payoff space in reduced to a point, we deduce that the boundary 
of the payoff space is indeed the transformation of the boundary of the square S, so that we have the following figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. The payoff space of the game. 
 
4.3 Nash equilibrium 
The unique Nash equilibrium payoff belongs to the payoff critical zone it is the payoff P’. It’s simple to check, by partial 
derivation. We give all the particulars in Appendix 1. 
4.4 Conservative phase 
Also the conservative bi-value of the game belongs to the payoff critical zone {P’}, as showed in the following figure. We 
give all the particulars in Appendix 2. 
 Figure 4. The conservative zone of the game (g, >) in its payoff space. 
 
 
4.5 Pareto boundary 
The Pareto maximal boundary is (straightforwardly) the union of two segments, showed in the below figure. Note that it is 
bounded but not compact and (obviously) not connected. 
 
 
Figure 5. The Pareto boundary in the payoff space (bounded but not closed). 
 
4.6 The conservative core 
The core is simply a compact segment, as it is shown in the figure below. It has the important characteristic to be entirely 
with the maximum collective (aggregate) value of the game. 
 
 Figure 6. The conservative core (which coincides with the Nash core) in the payoff space. 
 
4.7. Compromise solution 
We propose two compromise solutions, maximizing the collective payoff of the game. They are almost coincident. We 
propose Kalai-Smorodisky solutions with threat point the Nash equilibrium and utopia points, the sup of the game or the 
sup of the core. They are both win-win solutions with respect to the Nash payoff. 
 
 
Figure 7. The Kalai-Pareto compromise solution and the core compromise in the payoff space. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The novelty of our research are: 
1. we model, in a general and applicable framework, the interaction between a Government of a country and any 
possible relative tax-payer, by using a realistic probability (frequency) approach to the checking evasion 
strategy of the Government; 
2. we propose a realistic and realizable (by normative actions and laws) sample, of the general model; in this sample, 
the proper solution (Nash equilibrium) shows a situation in which the tax payer has no convenience to 
declare an income inferior than the real one; 
3. we propose, by the way, a measure of the collective loss in the above Nash equilibrium, by the total 
knowledge of the entire payoff space of the sample interaction; 
4. we show two (quantitatively close) compromise solutions, applicable (by binding contracts) in case of great 
distinguished tax-payers, maximizing the collective gain of the society. 
 
Appendix 1. Nash Equilibrium 
We have g(x,y)= (2x + y - 3xy, -3x – y + 3xy), for every x,y in U. Then, 
 g2 (x,.)’(y) = ∂2 g2 (x,y) = -1 + 3 x ≥ 0, 
so the section g2 (x,.) is strictly increasing if x > 1/3, it is constant if x = 1/3 and it is strictly decreasing if x < 1/3. Hence, 
the reaction correspondence B2 is defined by B2(x) = {0} if x < 1/3, B2(x) = F if x = 1/3 and B2(x) = {1} if x > 1/3. 
{0} if x ϵ [0, 1/3[ 
B2 (x) = [0,1]  if x = 1/3 
{1} if x ϵ ]1/3, 1] 
Again, we have g1 (x,y) = 2x + y – xy, for any x, y in [0,1]. Since 
g1 (.,y)’ (x) = ∂1 g1 (x,y) = 2 – 3y ≥ 0  
so the section g1 (.,y) is strictly increasing, if y < 2/3, it is constant, if y = 2/3, and it is strictly decreasing, if y > 2/3. Hence, 
the reaction correspondence B1 is defined by B1(y) = {1} if y < 2/3, B1(y) = E, if y = 2/3, and B1(y) = {0}, if y > 2/3. 
{1} if y ϵ [0, 2/3[ 
B1 (y) = [0,1]  if y = 2/3 
{0} if y ϵ ]2/3, 1] 
Nash Equilibria. We have only one Nash equilibrium, the point N = (1/3, 2/3). The Nash payoff is 
N’ = g(N) = (2(1/3) + (2/3) – 3(1/3)(2/3), – 3(1/3) – (2/3) + 3(1/3)(2/3)) = (2/3, – 1). 
 
 
Figure A1. The Best replay graphs with Nash equilibrium. 
Appendix 2. Conservative phase. 
The conservative value for the first player is 
 v1#  = supx ϵ E  infy ϵ F (2x + y - 3xy) = supx ϵ E g1# (x), 
where g1# (x) = infy ϵ F (2x + y - 3xy) is the worst gain function for the first player. Now, fixed x ϵ [0,1], we have 
g1(x,.)’(y) = 1- 3x, 
so the section g1 (x,.) is strictly increasing if x < 1/3, it is constant if x = 1/3 and it is strictly decreasing if x > 1/3. Hence, 
the offensive correspondence O2 is defined by O2(x) = {0} if x < 1/3, O2(x) = F if x = 1/3 and O2(x) = {1} if x > 1/3. 
So that the worst gain function for the Government is defined by 
  g1 (x, 0) = 2 x if  x ≤ 1/3 
g1# (x) = 
  g1 (x, 1) = 1 – x if  x > 1/3 
The unique maximum point of the above function is x# = 1/3, this is the unique conservative strategy of the first player. 
The conservative value of the first player is v1# = g1# (x#) = 2/3. 
The conservative value for the second player is 
 v2#  = supy ϵ F infx ϵ E (-3x – y + 3xy) = supy ϵ F g2# (y), 
where 
g2# (y) = infx ϵ E (-3x – y + 3xy) 
is the worst gain function for the second player. Now, fixed y ϵ [0,1], we have g2(.,y)’(x) = -3 + 3y, so the section g2 (.,y) is strictly 
decreasing if y < 1, it is constant if y = 1. Hence, the offensive correspondence O1 is defined by O1(y) = {1} if y < 1, O1(y) 
= E, if y = 1. So that the worst gain function for the Taxpayer is defined by g2# (y) = g1 (1, y) = -3 + 2y, for every y in F. 
The unique maximum point of the above function (in F) is y# = 1, this is the unique conservative strategy of the second 
player. The conservative value of the second player is v2# = g2# (y#) = -1. The payoff at the conservative cross is the 
Mash Payoff, g (1/3 , 1) = (2/3 , - 1). 
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